Abstract-Time-memory-data (TMD) trade-off attack is a wellstudied technique that has been applied on many stream and block ciphers. Current TMD attacks by Biryukov-Shamir (BS-TMD), Hong-Sarkar (HS-TMD) and Dunkelman-Keller (DK-TMD) has been applied to ciphers like Grain-v1 and AES-192/256 modes of operation to break them with online complexity faster than exhaustive search. However, there is still a limitation because the precomputation is slower than exhaustive search for these attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new TMD attack that can break Estream ciphers and block cipher standards with both precomputation and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search. The attack works whenever the IV length is shorter than the key length. Therefore, Estream ciphers like Grainv1, Rabbit, Salsa20, SOSEMANUK, MICKEY and block cipher standards like AES-192/256, KASUMI, IDEA, SAFER can all be broken. We also point out that our attack rely on less stringent requirements than known attacks on stream and block ciphers such as cube attack and related-key differential/boomerang attacks. Finally, we adapt our attack to the multi-user setting and show that the attack complexities can be reduced further. Zenner had proposed that stream ciphers should be designed with IV length equal to key length to resist TMD attacks in the multi-user setting. We show that this requirement is not sufficient for ciphers like Trivium, AES-128 and HC-128 where IV length equal key length can all be broken by our multi-user TMD attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Time-memory trade-off (TMTO) attack was first introduced by Hellman in [19] , which is used to invert one-way functions y = f (x). Some applications of TMTO attacks include finding the pre-image of a hash function or finding the secret key/secret state of a stream cipher. In this method, the attacker does a pre-computation that covers the whole search space N through multiple arrays, called Hellman Tables. But he only stores part of this pre-computation, the start and end points of the Hellman tables in a memory of size M . In the online attack, he computes the pre-image x of a target y by making use of the Hellman tables with complexity T = N 2 /M 2 . If
This is an extended version of our AsiaCCS 2012 paper [21] . We improved [21, Proposition 1] to Theorem 2 in this paper to make the characterisation of existing TMD attacks more complete, added numerical values for the attacks in Tables 1 and 2 , and optimized all the examples of [21] to use less memory in the attacks. We include new Sections VIII-IX, on applying our time-memory-data trade-off attack in the multi-user setting, which has lower attack complexities than those of [21] , and can break established stream cipher guidelines which was designed to resist TMD attacks in the multi-user setting.
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a memory of M = N 2/3 is used, then the online attack has complexity T = N 2/3 .
However one limitation of the Hellman attack is that the pre-processing complexity P = N is equivalent to exhaustive search. Thus, it is only useful for ciphers which are "marginally breakable", i.e. where it is only feasible to spend a lot of resources to do a one-time pre-computation, after which, the cipher can be broken easily with much less effort. Biryukov and Shamir [8] overcame this limitation for stream ciphers by proposing a time-memory-data trade-off attack on D keystream bits. By taking windows of n bits where n is the state size, the attacker just needs to invert any one of the D keystream blocks to find the secret state, from which he can deduce all subsequent keystream. The precomputation complexity is then P = N/D and online attack complexity is T = N 2 /(M 2 D 2 ), but subject to the condition T ≥ D 2 . For example, if both the internal state and the key has the same size N , then (P, D, M, T ) = (2 3n/4 , 2 n/4 , 2 n/2 , 2 n/2 ) is an admissible attack. Now both pre-computation and online attack complexity can be less than exhaustive search.
Because of this attack, subsequent stream cipher designs usually have the state size to be 1.5 to 2 times of the key size and the Biryukov-Shamir attack can be thwarted. In [20] , Hong and Sarkar noticed that although the state size is now twice the key size, the IV size is sometimes very short. So they proposed a new time-memory-data trade-off attack that instead of mapping the state to the keystream, now maps a (Key,IV)-tuple to the keystream. The attack has the same trade-off curve as the Biryukov Shamir attack except that the search space N is now KV where K is the key space and V is the IV space. They applied their attack on the initial Estream recommendation of 80-bit key-size and 32-bit IV-size for stream ciphers; and on the GSM cipher A5/3, which has key size 64-bit and IV size 22-bit. They showed that both were insecure and can be attacked with pre-computation and online attack complexity less than exhaustive search.
In [17] , Dunkelman and Keller proposed an alternative timememory-data trade-off attack where D represents the number of IV resyncs. They essentially get the same trade-off curve as the Biryukov-Shamir attack, but with the condition T ≥ D 2 replaced by the condition T ≥ D and V ≥ D where V is the IV space. With this attack, they manage to decrease the preprocessing complexity when attacking modern stream ciphers, but it is still at least as slow as exhaustive search on the secret key space.
A. Our Contribution
In this paper, we introduce a new time-memory-data tradeoff attack in which both the pre-processing and online attack complexity of modern stream ciphers can be faster than that of exhaustive search. The idea is to break up the available online data complexity into two parts: D IV to be the number of IV re-syncs, and D single to be the number of keystream bits available for each IV. We essentially get the same tradeoff curve as the Biryukov-Shamir attack: P = N/D where D = D IV D single and N = KV ; and online attack complexity
The attack is subjected to the conditions V ≥ D IV , and T single ≥ D 2 single . We apply this new time-memory-data trade-off attack to various Estream finalists and block ciphers in modes of operations; and also study the relationship of the key length and IV length in practical attacks. We describe these in detail as follows:
In Section V-A, we apply our attack to the Estream finalist Grain-v1 [18] with 80-bit key and break it with 2 76 preprocessing and 2 68 online attack complexity. In comparison, the current known attacks on Grain-v1 cannot break it with both pre-processing and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search. For example, the conditional differential cryptanalysis of Knellwolf et al. [22] only breaks 104 out of 160 initialization rounds of Grain-v1. It can also be verified that the time-memory-data trade-off attacks of BiryukovShamir, Hong-Sarkar and Dunkelman-Keller [8] , [20] , [17] all have pre-computation complexity worse than exhaustive search. Bjorstad [11] tried to improve the Biryukov-Shamir time-memory-data trade-off attack on Grain-v1, by using a guess-and-determine attack to decrease the sampling resistance by R = 2 −18 which results in lower pre-computation complexity. However, the pre-computation complexity is still between 2 103 and 2 110 , which is worse than exhaustive search. In Section V-B, we also apply our attack to the stream cipher Grain-128 [18] with 128-bit key and break it with 2 120 pre-processing and 2 104 online attack complexity. In comparison, the current known attacks on Grain-128 cannot break it with both pre-processing and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search. For example, the conditional differential cryptanalysis of [22] only breaks 213 out of 256 initialization rounds of Grain-128, while the dynamic cube attack of Dinur and Shamir [16] breaks it for a subset of 2 −10 of the possible keys, and not the full key space. Moreover, cube attack requires chosen IV's while our attack does not. It can also be verified that the time-memory-data trade-off attacks of Biryukov-Shamir, Hong-Sarkar and Dunkelman-Keller [8] , [20] , [17] all have pre-computation complexity worse than exhaustive search.
Based on the framework presented in [20, Section 4 and [7] and 2 99 time complexity with four relatedkey/subkey under chosen-ciphertext for related-key boomerang attack [5] . But our attacks are more realistic because it only requires sufficiently many IV-resyncs and known/chosen plaintext attacks as compared to the more stringent requirements in the attacks of [5] , [7] .
In Section VII-A, we proved that our attack has both preprocessing and online complexity faster than exhaustive search if and only if the IV length is less than the key length.
As an application, we show that besides Grain-v1, the other Estream Finalists such as Rabbit, Salsa20, SOSEMANUK and MICKEY [10] , [4] , [3] , [2] can also be attacked. When applying to block ciphers in CBC, CFB, OFB and counter modes of operation, the AES finalists Rijndael, Serpent, Twofish, RC6, MARS [15] , [1] , [27] , [26] , [9] , as well as standard ciphers like KASUMI, IDEA and SAFER SK-128 [25] , [23] , [24] can all be attacked by our method.
In comparison, we prove that the Hong-Sarkar attack cannot have both pre-processing and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search if and only if the IV length is at least half the key length; while the pre-processing complexity for the Dunkelman-Keller attack is always worse than exhaustive search. Thus, our attack has better overall complexity as compared to previous time-memory-data trade-off attacks on ciphers with IV resyncs. It has been suggested by Zenner [29] that the key length should be equal to the IV length in the multi-user setting. Our result shows that even in the singleuser setting, we also require key and IV length to be equally long.
In Section VII-B, we also propose a more practical application scenario where the IV is allowed to be shorter than the key length as long as both the pre-processing and online attack are less than an impractically high complexity. If 2 s is considered an impractical attack complexity to launch, then the IV only need to be at least (2s − k)-bit long when the key is k-bit long. For example, if the secret key is 256-bit and we consider 2 160 to be impractical, then the IV can be 64-bit long.
In Section VIII, we consider our attack in the multiuser setting. In this case, the adversary succeeds if he can find the secret key of one out of D user users. This idea was first explored by Biryukov et al. [6] in the context of breaking UNIX password hashes, and later refined by Choy et al. for multiple-encryption [14] . We show that it can be used to improve our attack complexity further: E.g. when attacking Grain-128 on 2 20 users, we can improve both the preprocessing and online attack complexities by a factor of 2 10 to P = 2 110 and T = 2 94 , as compared to our earlier attack. When attacking AES-256 on 2 20 users, we can also reduce both our earlier attack complexities by 2 10 to P = 2 214 and T = 2 150 . Moreover in both attacks, less memory is required. In Section IX, we applied the multi-user attack to stream ciphers where key length is equal to the IV length. It has been suggested as a guideline (e.g. see Zenner [29] ) that key length equal IV length can protect against multi-user TMD attack. We showed that this may not be adequate by breaking Trivium (80-bit key and IV) with pre-processing 2 72 and online attack 2 68 when attacking 2 20 users. We also broke HC-128 and AES-128 (128-bit key and IV) with pre-processing 2 120 and online attack 2 116 when attacking 2 20 users. We also provide a generic proof that pre-processing and online attack complexity can always be faster than exhaustive search when we apply our attack on stream ciphers with key length equal IV length.
II. NOTATIONS
In this section, we list down the definition for common notations used in this paper. 
III. EXISTING TIME-MEMORY-DATA TRADE-OFF (TMD)
ATTACKS ON STREAM CIPHERS A. Biryukov-Shamir (BS-TMD) Attack [8] Let N = 2 n be the stream cipher state space, M be memory used to store the pre-computed data, D be total number of data points (keystream blocks) available in an online attack, P be the pre-computation complexity and T be the online attack complexity. In the pre-computation phase, choose m, t such that mt 2 = N . Form t/D Hellman tables of size m × t as follows: Randomly choose m starting points corresponding to n-bit states of the stream cipher. For each start point, form a chain of length t by iteratively applying the stream cipher f (·) and using the n-bit keystream as the state for the next point. Then, mt × t/D = N/D of the state space is covered by all the tables. After forming each table, only the start and end points are stored in memory, the rest of the data are discarded. In total, M = m × t/D memory is used.
During an online attack, the attacker collects D target keystream blocks. For each target keystream y, he checks if end point = f i (y) for an end point of each Hellman table. If there is a match, then f t−i−1 (start point) of the corresponding start point will be the correct state which gives this keystream.
Note that the attack is valid only when there is at least one
Remark 1: When D = 1, then the above attack reduces to Hellman's TMTO attack which has complexities P = N and
B. Hong-Sarkar (HS-TMD) Attack [20] Let K be the key space, V be IV space of a stream cipher. The Hong-Sarkar TMD attack is essentially the BS-TMD attack, except that the search space is {Key Space} × {IV Space} with size N = K × V . We treat both the secret key and IV as unknown in the pre-computation phase. The rest of the attack is similar to the BS-TMD attack, except that each point in the Hellman tables corresponds to a particular (Key, IV )-tuple. These points are used to initialize the stream cipher f (·) where a (k + v)-bit keystream block is used as the next (Key, IV )-tuple. Finally, N/D of the (Key, IV ) search space is covered by all the tables.
The trade-off curve for this attack is the same as the BS-TMD attack using N = K ×V . The only difference is that the target is now the key and IV space. Hong and Sarkar used this idea to attack the GSM A5/3 cipher [20, Section 3.3] , where the 128-bit state size is twice the 64-bit secret key, so that the BS-TMD attack on the state will not have good complexity. Due to small IV size of 22 bits, it allows for the HS-TMD attack to have online and pre-processing complexity smaller than 2 64 .
C. Dunkelman-Keller (DK-TMD) Attack [17]
Dunkelman and Keller proposed an alternative TMD attack, which exploits the fact that the IV is known during an online attack. They consider a scenario where only one keystream block corresponding to each of D IV's needs to be known to the adversary. First, the adversary performs the TMTO precomputation individually for each fixed IV. The memory and pre-computation complexity for a single IV are M single and K; and the total memory and pre-computation for all V /D IV's are M = V /D×M single and P = V /D×K respectively. In an online attack, the attacker waits for an IV to occur which matches one of his pre-computed IV. Since the probability of a matching IV is (V /D)/V = 1/D, this is expected to occur after D IV-resyncs. Then he proceeds to do a TMTO attack for that IV, with complexity K 2 /M 2 single to find the secret key.
Pre-processing: In attacking symmetric ciphers, the usual definition of a successful attack is one where the complexity is faster than exhaustive search. Sometimes when the key length is short, the current literature for time-memory-data trade-off attack allows the pre-computation to be worse than exhaustive search, while the subsequent online attack is more efficient than exhaustive search. For example, Bjorstad applied the BS-TMD attack on the Estream finalist Grain-v1 (80-bit key, 64-bit IV, 160-bit state) [11] where the online attack complexity is between 2 64 and 2
78 but the corresponding pre-computation complexity is between 2 110 and 2 103 respectively. However, when we apply the known TMD attacks on a stream cipher of larger key size, e.g. key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits, the pre-processing complexity becomes infeasible. As an example, let us consider the Grain-128 stream cipher with 128-bit key, 96-bit IV and 256-bit state.
For the BS-TMD attack, T < 2 128 implies D ≤ √ T < 2 64 . Then the pre-processing complexity will be P = N/D > 2 256−64 = 2 192 which is infeasible. For the HS-TMD attack, T < 2 128 implies D ≤ √ T < 2 64 . Then the pre-processing complexity will be P = N/D = KV /D > 2 128+96−64 = 2 160 which is infeasible. For the DK-TMD attack, preprocessing complexity is P = N/D = KV /D. But D being the number of IV's is at most V , therefore P ≥ K = 2 128 , which is a high complexity. In this case, the attacker only does one IV pre-computation, thus he needs the sender to cycle through all 2 96 IV resync's before he hits the right IV.
IV. A NEW IMPROVED TIME-MEMORY-DATA TRADE-OFF ATTACK ON STREAM CIPHERS
In this section, we propose an improved TMD attack on stream ciphers with IV-resync, which performs better than the BS-TMD, HS-TMD and DK-TMD attack. More specifically, our attack can achieve both pre-processing and online complexity faster than exhaustive search for scenarios where the previous attacks cannot.
We describe our attack as follows. Let N = K × V . We assume a known plaintext attack where each ciphertext bit corresponds to a keystream bit. to do a TMD attack with complexity:
to find the secret key. The online complexity, which adds D (time to wait for a pre-processed IV) and T single (attack complexity on a single IV), is:
We essentially get the same complexity as the BS-TMD, HS-TMD and DK-TMD attacks. However, we have a different set of conditions on the data D = D IV × D single , where
In the next two sections, we shall see how this method enables us to break Grain and AES modes of operation with pre-processing and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search, while the previous three methods cannot.
V. ATTACK ON GRAIN-V1 AND GRAIN-128 WITH PRE-PROCESSING AND ONLINE COMPLEXITY FASTER THAN EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH Grain-v1 is an Estream finalist with key size 80-bit, IV size 64-bit and state size 160-bit [18] . There is a variant of Grain called Grain-128, which has 128-bit key, 96-bit IV and 256-bit state [18] .
A. Attack on Grain-v1
Consider the HS-TMD attack on Grain-v1 with key size 80-bit and IV size 64-bit. To get online attack complexity T < 2 80 , we need D ≤ √ T < 2 40 . However, that means pre-processing complexity P = KV /D = 2 80+64−40 > 2 104 , which is worse than exhaustive search.
When we apply the BS-TMD attack on the 160-bit state space of Grain-v1, we again need D < 2 40 to have T < 2 80 and thus P = N/D > 2 160−40 = 2 120 . Bjorstad [11] used a guess and determine attack on the state space to decrease the sampling resistance to R = 2 −18 so that the condition D 2 < T is relaxed to (RD) 2 < T . This allows for a lower pre-processing complexity of 2 103 . However, it is still worse than exhaustive search.
Finally, as noted in Section III-D, the DK-TMD attack has pre-processing P > 2 80 . We will apply the attack of Section IV on Grain-v1 to get both pre-processing and online attack complexity less than 2 80 . We have K = 2 80 , V = 2 64 and N = K × V = 2 144 . Choose D single = 2 20 and D IV = 2 48 , thus D IV ≤ V . Then the total online data needed for the attack is:
The pre-processing complexity is:
Choose a memory size of M = 2 44 , then the online attack complexity for a single IV is:
single . The online complexity satisfies:
B. Attack on Grain-128
As explained in Section III-D, the BS-TMD, HS-TMD and DK-TMD attacks on Grain-128 all have pre-processing complexity > 2 128 which is infeasible. We will apply the attack of Section IV on Grain-128 to get both pre-processing and online attack complexity < 2 128 . We
32 and D IV = 2 72 , thus D IV ≤ V . Then the total online data needed for the attack is:
Choose a memory size of M = 2 70 , then the online attack complexity for a single IV is:
The online complexity satisfies: Attacking block ciphers in the OFB and counter modes of operation are straightforward adaptation of TMD attacks on the keystream, which can be deduced from known plaintexts. In [20] 
A. Attack on AES-192
The key space is K = 2 192 and IV space is V = 2 128 , which implies N = KV = 2 320 . In [20] , the authors applied the HS-TMD attack with M = 2 160 and D = 2 80 to get T = 2 2(320−160−80) = 2 160 ≥ D 2 . However, the pre-processing complexity is P = N/D = 2 320−80 = 2 240 which is worse than exhaustive search. Our Attack: Choose D single = 2 48 , D IV = 2 96 < 2 128 , then the total online data is
and pre-processing complexity is
Let the total memory used be M = 2 106 . Then, the attack complexity of a single IV satisfies
and the total online attack time is
Because of Remark 2, the attacker may not need to wait for D IV = 2 96 resyncs with 2 48 data per resync. He could wait for e.g., 2 76 resyncs and collect 2 68 data per resync. If any of the ciphertext block in the initial 2 20 data matches a pre-computed IV, he will take a window of 2 48 data to do the TMD attack for that IV. Thus the chaining structure for the mode of operation allows us to have flexibility when choosing D single and D IV .
B. Attack on AES-256
The key space is K = 2 256 and IV space is V = 2 128 , which implies N = KV = 2 384 . In [20] 
Let the total memory used be M = 2 146 . Then, the attack complexity of a single IV satisfies
single , and the total online attack time is
Similar to the previous attack, the adversary has flexibility in choosing D single and D IV because of the chaining structure of modes of operation as explained in Remark 2.
For AES-256, there exist related-key attacks with better complexities. Related-key differential attack can break AES-256 with 2 130 time complexity based on 2 35 related keys under chosen plaintext attack [7] .
There is also a related-key boomerang attack with 2 99 time complexity using a quartet of four related-key under chosenciphertext decryption [5] . However, two of the key-relations in the related-key quartet are subkey relations, which are even harder to achieve in practice because the adversary will need to control the key schedule, and not just the keys.
In comparison, our attacks are more realistic because it only requires sufficiently many IV-resyncs and known/chosen plaintext as compared to the existence of related-key/relatedsubkey pairs and chosen-plaintext/chosen-ciphertext attacks.
VII. SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS A. Choice of Key-IV Length for Protection or Against Our TMD Attack
In this section, we study the condition of the attack of Section IV having pre-processing and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search. From it, we deduce what the IV length should be to defend against this attack.
Theorem 1: Consider a stream cipher with Key Space K = 2 k and IV space V = 2 v .
1) If v ≥ k and we require the online attack complexity to satisfy T < K for the attack in Section IV, then the pre-processing complexity satisfies P > K. 2) If v < k, then the pre-processing and online complexity of the attack in Section IV can both be faster than exhaustive search, i.e. P, T < K. Proof: 1) For the online complexity T = D + T single to be less than K, this implies D < K. Then the preprocessing complexity is as follows:
2) Choose M single = 2 k/2 and D single = 2 k/4 . Then the online attack complexity for a single IV is:
Such a D IV can be chosen because v < k implies v − k/4 < min(v, 3k/4). Also, if v < k/4 in the lower bound, it means we can take any value of D IV ≥ 1. Multiplying the above inequality by D single = 2 k/4 , we get:
The pre-processing complexity satisfies:
The online complexity satisfies:
Remark 3: In this proof, we have used
which is chosen to get the lowest value for T single . However, we could have chosen M single (and thus M ) to be lower to get a higher value for T single . This is because the online attack complexity T is a sum of D and T single and D is usually much higher than the optimal (lowest) value for T single . For example, in the attack on AES-256 in Section VI-B,
Thus we can optimize the proof of Theorem 1 to use less memory when estimating the attack complexities in practice. From Theorem 1, we have the following corollary: Corollary 1: In a stream cipher, the pre-processing and online complexity of the attack of Section IV are both faster than exhaustive search if and only if the IV length is less than the key length. Therefore to protect against the attack of Section IV, we may design stream ciphers with IV length equal to key length.
For the sake of comparison, we prove the following proposition. From here, we see that our attack, which allows for faster pre-processing, is more effective than the HS-TMD and DK-TMD attacks. It also imposes a more stringent constraint on the length of the IV for adequate security.
Theorem 2: 1) In the BS-TMD attack [8] on a stream cipher, the pre-processing and online attack complexity are both faster than exhaustive search if and only if the state size is less than 3/2 times the key length. 2) In the HS-TMD attack [20] on a stream cipher, the preprocessing and online attack complexity are both faster than exhaustive search if and only if the IV length is less than half the key length. 3) In the DK-TMD attack [17] on a stream cipher, the preprocessing complexity cannot be faster than exhaustive search irrespective of the IV length. Proof:
If the online attack complexity T is less than exhaustive search, i.e. T < K, then D 2 ≤ T implies D < K 1/2 , and pre-processing complexity satisfies:
K 1/2 = K. Thus we cannot have both online and pre-processing complexity faster than exhaustive search.
Furthermore, the condition D 2 ≤ T also holds.
2) The HS-TMD attack is just the BS-TMD attack with N = KV . Thus the pre-processing and online attack complexity cannot both be faster than exhaustive search if and only if N = KV ≥ K 3/2 , which is equivalent to the condition V ≥ K 1/2 . 3) Since D IV is the number of IV's, we have D IV ≤ V , which implies the pre-processing of the DK-TMD attack satisfies P = KV /D IV ≥ K.
1) Applications to Estream Finalists.:
Besides the cipher Grain-v1 and Grain-128 [18] which we attacked in Sections V-A and V-B, the other Estream finalists Rabbit, Salsa20, SOSEMANUK and MICKEY [10] , [4] , [3] , [2] are also susceptible to our attack by Theorem 1, because the IV size is smaller than the key size as shown in Table I . The attack does not apply to HC-128 and Trivium [28] , [12] because the key size is equal to the IV size. In comparison, the BS-TMD, HS-TMD and DK-TMD Attacks [8] , [20] , [17] on these stream ciphers are not faster than exhaustive search by Theorem 2.
The attack complexities of 48 , M = 2 44 to get P = 2 76 , T = 2 68 . 2) Applications to Block Ciphers: Many of today's block ciphers has block size 128-bit (also IV size) and key sizes 128, 192 or 256-bit as specified by the NIST Advanced Encryption Standard competition. This includes the five finalists Rijndael, Serpent, Twofish, RC6 and MARS [15] , [1] , [27] , [26] , [9] . When they are used in modes of operation like CBC, CFB, OFB and counter mode, the versions with 192-bit and 256-bit keys are susceptible to our attack as shown in the computations of Section VI and by Theorem 1. Also, well-known ciphers like IDEA, SAFER SK-128 and KASUMI [23] , [24] , [25] , has 64-bit block (IV) and 128-bit key, so again by Theorem 1, they can be broken by our attack. The attack does not apply to SMS4 and AES-128 because the 128-bit key size is equal to the IV size. In comparison, the HS-TMD and DK-TMD Attacks [8] , [20] , [17] on these block ciphers are not faster than exhaustive search by Theorem 2. For reference, we list the key and IV sizes of the block ciphers we considered in Table II . The attack complexities of Table II 
B. Usage of short IVs
In practice, IV resync information is frequently sent. So to save bandwidth, it might be advantageous to use shorter IV for better performance. But as pointed out by Hong and Sarkar in [20, Section 3.3] on the original Estream call for ciphers and [20, Section 3.4] on the GSM A5/3 ciphers, short IV's will lead to attacks with low complexity.
However, if the secret key is long, e.g. 256-bit, then the pre-computation and online attack complexity, though faster than exhaustive search, might still be impractical to launch. Let us formalize this notion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Consider a stream cipher with key space K = 2 k and IV space V = 2 v . Let K secure = 2 s be an attack complexity that is impractical to launch in practice. If the IV length is at least 2s − k, then the pre-processing and online complexity of the attack of Section IV cannot both be faster than K secure .
Proof: For the online attack complexity to be faster than K secure = 2 s , we need T = D + T single < 2 s which implies D < 2 s . However, the pre-processing complexity is:
Example 1: Consider a stream cipher with 192-bit key and suppose 2 160 to be an impractical complexity to attack, then we just need an IV of length 2 × 160 − 192 = 128 bits.
Example 2: Consider a stream cipher with 256-bit key and suppose 2 160 to be an impractical complexity to attack, then we just need an IV of length 2 × 160 − 256 = 64 bits.
VIII. NEW IMPROVED TIME-MEMORY-DATA TRADE-OFF ATTACK ON MULTIPLE USERS
In this section, we show that the attack complexities of our attack can be improved further by considering the multi-user setting. The idea of using time-memory-data trade-off to attack multi-users was first proposed by Biryukov et al. at [6] to break UNIX password hashes, and later refined by Choy et al. for multiple-encryption [14] . In this scenario, the adversary succeeds if he breaks the key of one out of D user users.
We describe our attack as follows. Let N = K × V where K is the key space and V is the IV space. We assume a known plaintext attack where each ciphertext bit corresponds to a keystream bit.
1 
3) In an online attack, the attacker waits for an IV to occur for one of the D user users which matches one of his pre-computed IV. Since the probability of a matching to do a TMD attack with complexity:
to find the secret key. The online complexity, which adds D/D user (time to wait for a pre-processed IV) and T single (attack complexity on a single IV), is:
The necessary conditions for this attack to work is that T single ≥ (D single ) 2 and D IV × D user ≤ V . In the attack of Section IV, D (the waiting time for a precomputed IV) dominates T single (the online attack complexity for that IV). So reducing D to D/D user would be able to reduce the online attack complexity T by a factor of D user .
Let us apply the attack to some ciphers below.
A. Multi-User TMD Attack on Grain-128
The key space is K = 2 128 and IV space is V = 2 96 , which implies N = KV = 2 224 . In Section V-B, we applied TMD attack with D single = 2 32 , D IV = 2 72 < 2 96 , to get pre-processing complexity P = 2 120 . With a memory of M = 2 70 , the attack complexity is T = D + T single = 2 104 + 2 100 ≈ 2 104 , where
Let the total memory used be M = 2 65 . Then, the attack complexity on a single user and IV satisfies:
and the total online attack time is:
Thus we have both pre-processing P and online attack T faster than the attack of Section V-B by 2 10 , while using 2 5 less memory.
B. Multi-User TMD Attack on AES-256
The key space is K = 2 256 and IV space is V = 2 128 , which implies N = KV = 2 384 . As mentioned in Section VI-B, Hong 
170 and pre-processing complexity is
Let the total memory used be M = 2 141 . Then, the attack complexity on a single user and IV satisfies:
single , and the total online attack time is:
Thus we have both pre-processing P and online attack T faster than the attack of Section VI-B by 2 10 , while using 2 5 less memory.
IX. KEY LENGTH EQUAL IV LENGTH DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION IN THE MULTI-USER SETTING
By Theorem 2, we see that the HS-TMD attack cannot work when the IV length is at least half the key length. However in the multi-user setting, the HS-TMD attack can break ciphers with pre-processing and online complexity faster than exhaustive search even when the IV length is longer than half the key length. Therefore, Zenner [29] suggested that the IV length should be equal to the key length for adequate protection against TMD attacks in the multi-user setting. This is also used as a guideline in some estream cipher design like HC-128 and Trivium.
On a related note, we showed in Corollary 1 that the attack of Section IV cannot work if the IV length is equal to the key length. But we showed in section VIII that if we adapt the attack of Section IV to the multi-user setting, it can perform better than the original attack of Section IV. Thus it may have a chance to break ciphers where IV length is equal to the key length, e.g. Trivium, AES-128 and HC-128. We shall show that this is indeed true with the following examples.
A. Multi-User Attack on Trivium
The key space is K = 2 80 and IV space is V = 2 80 , which
88 and pre-processing complexity is P = N/D = 2 160−88 = 2 72 .
Let the total memory used be M = 2 40 . Then, the attack complexity on a single user and IV satisfies:
Thus we have both pre-processing and online attack faster than exhaustive search 2 80 , although the IV length is equal to key length.
B. Multi-User Attack on AES-128 and HC-128
The key space is K = 2 128 and IV space is V = 2 128 , which implies
136 and pre-processing complexity is
Let the total memory used be M = 2 64 . Then, the attack complexity on a single user and IV satisfies:
Thus we have both pre-processing and online attack faster than exhaustive search 2 128 , although the IV length is equal to key length.
C. Generic Result
We generalize the above computation in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Let the key length and IV length of a stream cipher be equal. Then the multi-user TMD attack of Section VIII can break it with pre-computation and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search.
Proof: Let key size and IV size be K = V = 2 k . Then N = KV = 2 2k . Choose D user = 2 u where 0 < u < 2k/3, D single = 2 k/2−3u/4 and D IV = 2 k/2 . Then the total online data is:
Choose a memory size of M = 2 k/2+u/2 . The online attack for a single user and IV is:
2(2k−(k/2+u/2)−(k+u/4)) = 2 k−3u/2 ≥ D Thus we conclude that ciphers with the same key length and IV length can still be broken (faster than exhaustive search) by our TMD attack in the multi-user setting.
D. Choice of IV Length in the Multi-User Setting
As in Section IX-D, the following proposition gives the IV length which would protect a stream cipher against our multiuser TMD attack, assuming K secure = 2 s is an infeasible complexity for the adversary to attack.
Proposition 2: Consider a network of 2 u users communicating with a stream cipher having key space K = 2 k and IV space V = 2 v . Let K secure = 2 s be an attack complexity that is impractical to launch in practice. If the IV length is at least 2s+u−k, then the pre-processing and online complexity of the multi-user TMD attack of Section VIII cannot both be faster than K secure .
Proof: For the online attack complexity to be faster than K secure = 2 s , we need T = D/D user + T single < 2 s which implies D/D user < 2 s , i.e. D < 2 s × D user = 2 s+u . However, the pre-processing complexity is:
Example 3: Consider a network of 2 20 users communicating with a stream cipher having 128-bit key. Suppose we want exhaustive search to be infeasible, i.e. K secure = 2 128 . Then we need an IV of length 2 × 128 + 20 − 128 = 148 bits, which is longer than the key length.
Example 4: Consider a network of 2 20 users communicating with a stream cipher having 192-bit key. Suppose K secure = 2 160 is an impractical complexity to attack, then we need an IV of length 2 × 160 + 20 − 192 = 148 bits.
X. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new time-memory-data trade-off attack that performs better than existing ones. It has a similar tradeoff curve as existing attacks but a new set of necessary conditions on the online data D IV and D single , which allows us to attack previously unbroken ciphers. We prove that we can have both pre-processing and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search whenever the IV length is less than the key length. We applied our attack to break the Estream ciphers such as Grain-v1, Rabbit, Salsa20, SOSEMANUK and MICKEY [18] , [10] , [4] , [3] , [2] ; and also the block ciphers such as Rijndael, Serpent, Twofish, RC6, MARS, IDEA, SAFER SK-128 and KASUMI [15] , [1] , [27] , [26] , [9] , [23] , [24] , [25] in CBC, CFB, OFB and counter modes of operation. Finally, we looked at our attack in the multi-user setting where the adversary just needs to break one out of many users, e.g. in breaking UNIX password schemes. In that case, the attack complexity can be reduced further. Two examples are presented on Grain-128 and AES-256, where both the preprocessing and online attack complexities are reduced by 2 10 and memory is reduced by 2 5 when 2 20 users are attacked. Finally, we showed that the stream cipher guideline of key length equal IV length may not be sufficient to protect against multi-user TMD attacks and proceed to demonstrate attacks against Trivium, HC-128 and AES-128 with pre-processing and online complexity faster than exhaustive search.
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